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Science and a Whole Person Psychology:
Can Participatory Empiricism Ease the Way Forward?
Editor's Introduction

J

ack Schwarz (e.g., 2000, 2001) was a man with
the scientifically demonstrated ability to thrust
needles through his flesh and cause the resulting
wounds to close and heal in minutes without pain
or bleeding (Pelletier & Peper, 1977). This was
someone I wanted to meet. When I heard that he
was teaching small weekend workshops near his
home on the Northern California coast, I saved
tips from my work until I had enough money to
attend. To my disappointment, Jack Schwarz—then
about 70 years of age—no longer performed these
remarkable feats of self-healing, but he shared a
story that was in some ways more memorable.
Jack had discovered some of his unusual
capacities when he was a teenager in his native
Holland. He decided to become an entertainer and
profit by featuring his gifts in a stage show, so he
saved up money earned by delivering milk, rented a
large hall in Amsterdam, and advertised that a Dutch
boy would lie on a bed of nails. When the big night
came, the hall was completely empty except for a
couple who had received free tickets in exchange for
permission to place his flyer in their shop window.
The show was a failure, but Jack went back to his
job, saved up his money again, and rented the same
venue a second time a few years later. This time he
posed as a fakir from North Africa (a Muslim dervish
or mendicant) and filled the hall to capacity.
On May 10, 1940, while Jack was still a
teenager saving up money for his second performance,
German tanks rolled into the Netherlands. In occupied

Holland, Jack joined the resistance and helped locate
safe houses to shelter Jews. A few months after his
successful show, Jack was arrested and sent to a labor
camp in Germany. While there, a fellow prisoner
contracted typhus. The guards, unwilling to risk
contact with the deadly disease, put Jack in a cell with
the ill prisoner to serve as his caretaker. Jack realized
he had little time to live, as he would almost certainly
come down with the disease himself after nursing the
dying man. In that moment, he also accepted that his
healing capacities were not for his own gain, but a gift
to be used in selfless service. He determined to care
for his suffering cellmate with wholehearted devotion.
The man died, but Jack survived, escaped from the
labor camp—and from another German prison after
being re-arrested by the Gestapo for espionage. He
went on to do decades of research and teaching on
human health and healing. He credited this prison
experience with changing the central motivation that
inspired his life and his actions.
Powerful though it was, Jack’s transformative
experience would be difficult to fully account for in
the language of psychology. Cognitive, behavioral,
and neuroscientific work has contributed immensely
to psychology, yet often marginalizes aspects of self
that are challenging to describe in cognitive terms
such as felt sense, intuition, emotional intelligence,
inspiration, spirituality, mysticism, vision, creativity,
empathy, and presence. Cognitive skills will help
with filling out a job application but are less likely to
determine what one’s lifework will be, what values
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they will live by, and whom they will love. Lifedefining and life-changing choices are often shaped
by much more than rational decision-making,
yet rather than examining these wider aspects of
experience, scientific psychology has typically given
priority to what is easy to measure with current tools.
Transpersonal psychology has a sustained
interest in these harder-to-describe elements that
seem more central to human life than their role
in psychology would suggest. Such capacities are
often at the edges of the self of everyday experience,
sometimes associated with subtly or profoundly
shifted states of consciousness. These also include
Jack Schwarz’s exceptional capacity to rapidly heal
wounds to his body, which accords in some measure
with traditional accounts of allegedly miraculous
healing. According to documented observation in
controlled settings, Jack was able to insert large
needles through his bicep without pain, and actively
control whether and when the wound bled (Green
& Green, 1977; Pelletier & Horrigan, 2002; Pelletier
& Peper, 1977). Simultaneous measurement showed
that his brain waves switched to alpha when he
was controlling pain and bleeding, illustrating the
potential for voluntary control of these functions
through shift in state of consciousness. He was
reportedly able to teach others to successfully
accomplish a similar task (Norris, 1989).
Accounts of this type, however carefully
documented, deserve to be met with proper
skepticism and critical review; given their remarkable
potential, they also seem worthy of concerted
study. Instead, the response within psychology is
more often silence or outright ridicule. Perhaps in
reaction to such dismissal, transpersonal circles have
often characterized the wider field of psychology
as reductionistic, mechanistic, materialistic, and
empiricist (e.g., Grof, 1983; Rothberg, 1986; Walsh,
1997; Wilber, 1999). Empirical work itself seems to
arouse concern over these potential excesses, which
may in part explain why fewer than 100 empirical
papers were published in the two longest-running
transpersonal journals, combined, during the first
four decades of the field (Hartelius, Rothe, & Roy,
2013). As a result, transpersonal psychology has
been only marginally effective in advancing its
perspectives, constructs, and theories.
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With the development of participatory
thought over the past two decades (e.g., Ferrer,
2002, 2008, 2011a, 2017), however, there may be
potential for wider adoption of empirical methods
within transpersonal psychology with less risk of
distortion by the shortcomings of empiricist frames.
Given that participatory offers not only a philosophy,
but a tolerant and inclusive framework within which
to hold multiple epistemologies—including those
of science—with reduced hierarchy, it may now
be possible to approach transpersonal topics from
a multi-epistemic stance as has been proposed by
some scholars in the field (Ferrer, 2002, 2014; Mack,
1993; Vaughan, in Caplan, Hartelius, & Rardin,
2003).
It is critical to understand that the challenge
of implementing competing epistemologies within
the scientific discipline of psychology goes well
beyond the work of considering various cultural
perspectives in social and political contexts.
For example, if one were to include intuitive
epistemologies along with empiricism (Vaughan,
in Caplan, Hartelius, & Rardin, 2003), which
interpretive frame takes priority if intuition remains
at odds with empirical evidence? If a transpersonal
version of empiricism rests on “emotions, creativity,
imagination, and intuitions” (Cunningham, 2015, p.
100) as firmly as it does on critical thinking, then
how is psychology to exclude imaginative fraud
or creative misrepresentations? Proponents of this
approach have yet to articulate a way forward with
respect to these difficulties.
As part of the discussion it may be helpful
to consider positions held by the field’s most
prominent proponents of participatory thought,
Jorge N. Ferrer (e.g., 2002, 2008, 2011a, 2017), and
empirical methods, Harris L. Friedman (e.g., 2002,
2013/2015)—positions that are currently in some
tension with each other. I have worked closely
with both Ferrer and Friedman for many years and
have the highest respect for both as excellent but
very different scholars. I use participatory thought
in my own thinking and writing, and am at the
same time a strong proponent of cultivating more
empirical research to test and refine the constructs
and theories of transpersonal psychology. Indeed,
it was a participatory frame that enabled me to
Hartelius

recognize empirical science as simply another
situated approach to knowledge—one that is peer
to many others, if indispensable within psychology.
My intention here is to share with the reader a
stance that appears to be compatible with both
empiricism and participatory thought—what I have
called participatory empiricism.
In brief, a participatory stance views scientific
empiricism as a useful approximation of reality
offered from a particular cultural and philosophical
location. While empiricism holds priority within
scientific disciplines such as psychology, its priority
is situational rather than ontological. Ontologically,
empiricism has no priority over, say, Buddhism or
perennialism or yoga, but situationally, within a
scientific psychology, empiricism is the currency
of the context. In a similar way, it would be out of
place to use a strictly scientific argument in a debate
over a point of Buddhist doctrine among geshes
in a Buddhist monastery. Buddhism is no more or
less true than other traditions, but within Buddhist
institutions, Buddhist assumptions hold situational
priority. Within psychology, then, science has just
as much right to be empiricist as Buddhism has to
be Buddhist.
If transpersonal psychology is to incorporate
multiple epistemologies, then, it cannot be accomplished by offering these as multiple-choice options
so that empirical standards are accepted when their
results are pleasing, and rejected in favor of preferred
beliefs, intuitions, emotions, imagination, or creativity
when empirical results are discomfiting. This latter
seems to be the way in which the notions of plural
epistemologies and multiple ways of knowing have at
times been employed within the transpersonal field:
as permissive latitude to indulge in uncritical metaphysical speculation, experientialism, essentialism,
or specious reasoning in order to circumvent
thorny challenges with comforting solutions (e.g.,
Blackstone, 2006; Cunningham, 2015; Taylor, 2016,
2017a-c; Wilber, 2006).
What the transpersonal field can do—
and this might be instructive for other domains
of psychology as well—is implement plural
epistemologies as multiple sets of standards against
which constructs, theories, and evidence should
be simultaneously measured (cf. Hartelius, ThouinScience and a Whole Person Psychology

Savard, & Crouch, 2018). For example, a study may
be empirically sound, but may pose its research
question in a manner that privileges unconscious
assumptions based in a particular culture or state of
consciousness (cf. Tart, 1972), or that dismisses entire
categories of lived experience (e.g., Tart, 2004).
It is reasonable to ask that studies of experiential
phenomena be both empirically sound and fully
consonant with lived experience, or that studies of
Buddhist meditation offer doctrinal perspectives
along with psychological interpretations. Agreements between divergent epistemologies may yield
particularly rich insights, and differences may lead
to useful new research questions.
Another simple strategy is to require
that claims based in non-empirical perspectives
be clearly situated within their own frames. For
example, if a metaphysical perspective is offered,
it should be contextualized as such along with the
caveat that the view is entirely speculative, and
an explanation of what value it might provide—
for example, hermeneutical value. Examples are
Taylor's (2018) and Barratt's (2019; this issue)
papers, where speculative interpretations of subtle
somatic experiences are carefully identified as
such. Similarly, if a religious perspective is included,
it should be unambiguously situated within the
context of its own tradition, rather than being put
forward as psychological. For example, for the
IJTS issue on Integral Yoga Psychology, edited by
Debashish Banerji (2018; Vol. 37/1), the editorial
staff worked with each submitting author to ensure
that the content was offered within a critical frame,
with hermeneutical contexts and metaphysical
claims identified as such, while also authentically
reflecting Aurobindonian thought in a way that
remained resonant for members of the Integral
Yoga community. This process of discernment and
disclosure could go far toward facilitating a critically
sound approach to multiple epistemologies within
transpersonal psychology.
Before considering how a participatory
empiricism might mitigate some of the tension
between participatory and empirical perspectives,
it may be helpful to review how these two stances
fit within the development of the transpersonal
field. Four successive orientations have been
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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identified, and each characterized briefly in terms of
its contributions and liabilities.
Four Orientations in Transpersonal Psychology
rom its inception, the transpersonal field has
been no stranger to the challenge of multiple
epistemologies. It has wrestled with the fact that
phenomena of human spirituality are situated within
scores of different philosophies and metaphysical
frames. Its vision of combining the philosophy of
the East with the science of the West is complicated
by the fact that Eastern wisdom comes in six major
schools of Indian religion that encompass three
branches of Buddhism—and this reflects just one of
several major Eastern traditions. Its efforts to meet
this challenge have given rise to four major impulses
within the field: depth psychology, perennialism,
participatory thought, and empirical methods. While
the primary focus here will be how participatory
thought and empirical methods can be seen as
complementary, it is worth reviewing the first two
approaches.
The early transpersonal field was situated
within a depth psychology framework—so named
because it takes into account unconscious aspects of
mind (Ellenberger, 1970). Depth psychology explains
human spirituality by suggesting that it represents
underlying depths within humanity, or within
life itself (Washburn, 2003). A depth psychology
perspective is reflected in the thought of Stanislav
Grof, David Michael Levin, Michael Washburn,
and the early Ken Wilber; it can also be applied to
approaches based on the work of Eastern scholars
such as Sri Aurobindo Ghose, such as Assagioli’s
(e.g., 1969) psychosynthesis and Banerji’s (2018)
integral yoga psychology. Despite their value in
providing an uplifting explanatory frame, depth
approaches describe dynamics thought to be outside
of conscious awareness—and so necessarily remain
largely speculative and metaphysical. That is, these
are comprised primarily of lived experience and
culturally situated socially constructed meaning, with
few avenues for examination by empirical science.
Midway through the transpersonal field’s
first decade a second approach was introduced:
Wilber’s (e.g., 1975) version of perennialist thought,
which despite considerable evolution and efforts
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to reject the label, remains perennialist in structure
(Hartelius, 2017a). If depth psychology sought to
understand human resources below the conscious
mind, perennialism aspired to unify these depth
elements into a grand schema that ascribes these and
all the world’s spiritual traditions to a singular spiritual
source. Perennialist thought takes many forms, but its
essence is that spiritual traditions use culturally diverse
language and symbols to represent what is essentially
the journey to a single spiritual ultimate (Ferrer,
2000, 2002). It suggests that a single truth underlies
all traditions and is the goal of all paths. This view
was the primary philosophical orientation within the
field (Rothberg, 1986) until around 2000. By now
numerous serious issues with the viability of various
perennialist solutions have been identified, such as
the fact that these are essentialist, experientialist,
and metaphysical models that offer little more than
speculative pattern definition and circular reasoning
as their best evidence (see Ferrer, 2002; Ferrer, 2011b;
Hartelius, 2017b; Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013). While
unsuitable within psychology, these still serve as
inspiring spiritual visions for some New-Age oriented
communities (Hartelius, 2015, 2017c).
The alternative that has emerged and met
with considerable success in transpersonal thought
is a participatory philosophy as articulated by
Ferrer (e.g., 2001, 2002, 2008, 2011a; 2011b; Ferrer
& Sherman, 2008) and others (e.g., Heron, 1992,
2006; Kelly, 2008; Kremer, 2007; Tarnas, 1991).
Participatory thought understands the world to
be a dynamic and open-ended living system that
is continually involved in cocreating itself (Ferrer,
2011a), that mind and nature are necessarily woven
of the same fabric (cf. Bateson, 1979), and that
therefore consciousness in some form goes all the
way down to the basic materials of physicality
(Chalmers, 1995; De Quincey, 1994; Heron, 1992).
A particular contribution of participatory
thought is its challenge to Cartesian dualism—
the notion that the human person is some sort of
intellectual spirit of a very different substance than
the biological machine it inhabits. Even though
Descartes himself likely was not a substance dualist
(Strawson, 2006a-b, 2019), early European modernist
philosophy adopted this form of dualism and credited
Descartes. Separated from the natural world, the
Hartelius

rational mind could supposedly be a neutral agent
gathering objective information (cf. Nagel, 1986)—
fueling an exuberant, naïve objectivism and the
tantalizing Enlightenment prospect of absolutely
certain universal knowledge. Yet if consciousness
itself is actually part of the world then knowledge
is located in the world, and universal knowledge is
unattainable because the detached neutral observer
needed to gain such knowledge is fictional (cf.
Haraway, 1988; Nagel, 1986; Rorty, 1979). The
locatedness of knowledge makes Cartesian dualism
impossible, just as it collapses the divide between
spirit and matter, mind and body.
A limitation of participatory thought is that,
like Cartesianism, it is situated in what is clearly
a Western cultural frame. A participatory stance
“invokes mutual respect for the ways in which
each individual and each community brings their
particular insights and contributions” (Hartelius &
Ferrer, 2013), yet this goal is itself a value of the
secular humanism that developed from Europe’s
Enlightenment—one eschewed by any number of
orthodox religious or traditional societies around
the world. In addition to this philosophy Ferrer has
offered three criteria by which to evaluate spiritual
traditions: how well they combat egocentrism,
how well they counteract dissociation from the
body and other aspects of the whole person, and
how effectively they “foster ecological balance,
social and economic justice, religious and political
freedom, class and gender equality, and other
fundamental human rights” (Ferrer, 2011a, p. 7). The
very notion of human rights stems also from the Age
of Enlightenment, and the various rights enumerated
trace much of the history of how that concept has
developed in Western society since the 17th century.
In addition, Sherman (2008) traced the roots of a
participatory perspective to Greek philosophy,
and Tarnas (1991) attributed inspiration for its
contemporary form to thinkers of the Romantic era.
This limitation illustrates participatory thought’s
own acknowledged situatedness (Hartelius & Ferrer,
2013), which does not reduce its utility for the study
of human spirituality in its diversities.
Shortly
after
the
introduction
of
participatory thought Friedman formally introduced
empirical methods as a transpersonal approach
Science and a Whole Person Psychology

with his 2002 paper, Transpersonal Psychology
as a Scientific Field. This paper complements his
work and that by Douglas MacDonald and others
on describing and developing assessments and
constructs relevant to transpersonal psychology
(e.g., Friedman & MacDonald, 1997; Gabrhel &
Jezek, 2016; MacDonald, 2000, 2009; MacDonald
et al., 2015; MacDonald & Friedman, 2002, 2009,
2013; MacDonald, Friedman, & Kuentzel, 1999;
MacDonald & Kuentzel, 1999; MacDonald, LeClair,
Holland, Alter, & Friedman, 1995; Lopez, Jodhar, &
MacDonald, 2017; Mendez & MacDonald, 2012,
2017; St. John & MacDonald, 2007). Friedman’s
position is that transpersonal psychology, as a
subdiscipline of scientific psychology, should adopt
and use empirical scientific methods to study
transpersonal topics.
Friedman’s subsequent papers promoting
empirical work show recognition of the limitations
and disadvantages of these methods alongside his
affirmation of their pragmatic value (e.g., Friedman,
2013/2015). He has acknowledged that empirical
science is only capable of “modest generalizations”
(p. 57), and of describing how things function within
a limited context; it is not able to provide universal
explanations. A scientific approach is also incapable
of studying phenomena that are believed to exist,
but that cannot be measured in any way. A scientific
psychology could study the impact of belief in
certain metaphysical or supernatural phenomena,
it could study reports by individuals who claim to
have experienced those phenomena—perhaps in
some shifted state of consciousness—but it could
not directly study things that do not appear in some
way within the natural world. He has also affirmed
that science cannot escape empiricism, in the
sense that conceptualizing requires a knower and
something that is known, perpetuating a subjectobject divide.
Ferrer’s participatory thought (e.g., 2002)
and Friedman’s empirical approach (e.g., 2013/2015)
have both critiqued perennialist approaches and
offered alternatives that avoid some of the associated
metaphysical pitfalls. Participatory thought and
empirical methods are potentially complementary
in that each targets a different level in the
development of knowledge: participatory is a broad
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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philosophical frame without a specific method,
and empirical methods can be used within various
philosophical frames. Despite this, and as noted,
some disagreements between the two perspectives
have emerged in their early engagement, particularly
over the issue of empiricism.
Friedman’s Empirical Methods
versus Ferrer’s Participatory Thought
he first engagement between Friedman and
Ferrer came with Friedman’s (2013/2015)
characterization of participatory thought as
promoting “mini-theories that avoid explaining much
of anything” (p. 55)—a critique later sharpened
into the label, “a theory of nothing” (Friedman,
2018, p. 231). What Friedman has accurately
grasped here is that if knowledge is located, then
every knower, every point of sentience, holds its
own unique context and perspective (cf. Nagel,
1986). While this offers a different starting point
for knowledge construction than the imaginary
objective self who holds a “view from nowhere”
(Nagel, 1986), it is by no means the end of that
process. Each participant offers an approximation of
shared reality from their own specific location, and
together with other knowers and the world itself
a shared local reality is co-constructed—one that
offers negotiated generalizations. The emphasis on
located knowledge is no denial of or limitation on
the building of knowledge within shared realities,
but a call for greater respect for the differences
that individuals and communities bring to such
processes. Friedman’s (2018) critique appears to
serve as a convenient rhetorical device that allowed
him to contrast participatory as a “theory of nothing”
with perennialism as a “theory of everything” (p.
231) so he could offer his own solution of middlerange theory as the porridge that is just right.
Friedman's (2013/2015) critique appears to be
based on concern that Ferrer's approach "explicitly
does not seek to generalize results from its data" (p. 57),
which is a bit like complaining that a recipe written
on paper does not taste good, or that architectural
renderings of a Formula One racecar do not move
when you push on the drawing of the gas pedal.
Whether it is dinner or a fast automobile that is
being designed, it is helpful to lay out the conceptual
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ground beforehand—in preparation for cooking or
starting to assemble a vehicle chassis. Participatory
thought aims at careful evaluation of the conceptual
ground of transpersonal research in preparation for
that research, not in lieu of it. Friedman himself has
noted that empirical methods cannot yield universal
knowledge, a conclusion that requires thinking
about how knowledge construction works, apart
from the enterprise of actually doing research. His
impatience with a thorough articulation of this
same type of subject perhaps reflects his passion for
getting on with the research itself, but architecture
is just as noble a profession as building.
In response to this critique, Ferrer (2014)
has offered a detailed analysis of philosophical
assumptions in Friedman’s work, in the process
laying out a thorough and careful articulation
of reservations regarding empirical work and
science in general that are longstanding within
the transpersonal community. By way of example,
Ferrer’s (2002) earlier critiques of perennialism also
included charges that such models failed to fully
purge empiricism, leaving behind a residue of subtle
Cartesianism (p. 28). Ferrer (2014) has affirmed
the value of empirical research, but claimed that
following Friedman’s proposal to turn the field
“into a modern scientific discipline … effectively
binds transpersonal psychology to a naturalistic
metaphysical worldview that is hostile to most
spiritual knowledge claims” (p. 152). The charge
here is that holding the transpersonal field to the
standards of empirical science requires subscribing
to a reality in which mind and body, spirit and matter,
are irrevocably separate—one that has collapsed
spirit and consciousness into imaginary figments.
It should be clear that the tension is not
between empiricism as a limited Western worldview
and participatory thought as a universal philosophy,
but between two different branches of Western
thought; the selfsame Age of Enlightenment that
midwifed Friedman’s empiricism into the West also
birthed the values of rational tolerance espoused
by Ferrer. Nor is it a contest between hierarchical
and non-hierarchical systems, since the rejection
of hierarchies among spiritual traditions creates a
different sort of hierarchy by elevating tolerance.
The latter is not merely hypothetical, as a student
Hartelius

once shared with me that their traditional religious
beliefs had been held up to ridicule by other
students after a lecture on participatory thought on
grounds that traditional systems were metaphysical
and oppressive—so why would anyone remain
committed to them? This sort of intolerant behavior
is, of course, entirely inimical to the aims of a
participatory stance, but it illustrates the point that
even participatory thought cannot entirely eliminate
hierarchies.
Instead, the differences between Friedman's
and Ferrer's positions seem as if they may be at
least as much about framing and emphasis as
about substance. (I fully expect both scholars to
take issue with this framing of their differences as
well, as such is the nature of scholarly debate.) The
limits on the explanatory powers of empiricism that
Friedman (2013/2015) has acknowledged, and his
affirmation of its applicability within non-ordinary
states of consciousness, seem at least moderately
congruent with Ferrer’s (2014) view of empirical
methods. Consider Ferrer’s (2014) example of how
transpersonal research might be pursued beyond
what he considered the limits of empiricism. He
proposed that “a team of researchers focusing their
attention on the possible occurrence of external
visions” might take “a visionary medicine—such as
San Pedro or ayahuasca” (p. 175) and then compare
their experiences, leaving open how these might be
interpreted within various assumptions about reality.
A very similar project might well be pursued under
Friedman’s (2013/2015) relatively open definition of
empiricism:
To be seen as empirical data, all that is required
is that information be amenable (or potentially
amenable) to the senses, while it needs to be
recognized that the senses can operate under
many different consciousness states (e.g.,
under the influence of psychedelic substances;
Friedman, 2006). As long as phenomenological
data from an alternate state can be accessed with
some degree of reliability (again, a prerequisite
for being a scientifically valid observation),
either by the same researcher across time or by
others, it can be studied scientifically. (p. 61)
There seems little cause for disagreement here.
Science and a Whole Person Psychology

Where some of the confusion arises is
an apparent difference in the use of the term,
supernatural. Friedman’s (2013/2015) use of the
term implies a wholly speculative construction or
interpretation, one that cannot be accessed by means
of inner or outer senses under any circumstances.
Ferrer’s (2014) use of supernatural, on the other
hand, seems to be more synonymous with what
might be termed supernormal—that is, experiences
that are available to inner or outer senses under
exceptional circumstances. As in Ferrer's example
cited earlier, certain plant medicines may induce
visionary experiences which, though quite outside
of ordinary experience, are still within experience.
Friedman’s version of empiricism embraces study
of the supernormal, and rejects only the study of
the wholly speculative—that which cannot be
experienced under any circumstances, or in any state
of consciousness. When differences in definition
are accounted for, their positions on notions that are
wholly speculative, and experiential phenomena
accessed under exceptional circumstances, seem
congruent.
Another area of difference in language
concerns objectivity, which Ferrer (2014) has
identified as a liability and Friedman (2013/2015)
has named as necessity. On this basis Friedman
has characterized Ferrer’s work as some version of
intersubjective journalism, and Ferrer has in turn
implied that Friedman represents a sort of Western
scientific colonialism seeking to appropriate
spiritual resources from other cultures into its own
objectivist knowledge system. It may be, however,
that the objectivity decried by Ferrer is not entirely
identical with that promoted by Friedman.
For example, if knowing is limited and
located so that universal knowledge is not possible, if
there is no “view from nowhere” (Nagel, 1986), then
truly objective knowledge, wholly unaffected by
the subject who knows, is a fictional goal. This does
not mean that objectivity is a meaningless concept.
Systematic measurements of elevation taken from a
thousand different points spread across Japan would
provide considerably better information about its
geography than a single measurement from some
random location. Similarly, a thousand responses to
a validated scale on dating satisfaction by residents
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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of Boston collected on the basis of a statistically
valid sampling plan will say more about what it is
like to date in that city than tales of romance a friend
from Beacon Hill shares over tea or a beer. Careful
measurements of a thousand data points—whether
geographical or sociological—will provide data
that are more objective in the sense that they are
more likely to reflect the what it is like of a larger
shared reality than what it is like for some individual
or some unique point on a map (cf. Nagel, 1974).
Data that are more objective are less idiosyncratic,
and more generalizable, but they are no closer to
the imaginary idealization of an objectivity that
does not exist—one in which an immaterial knower
can dispassionately survey all the world without
affecting, being affected by, or even being located
in that world.
Friedman (2013/2015), in keeping with his
work as an empirical researcher, seems to have
used the term objectivity in the pragmatic sense
of greater generalizability, and in the common
sense that research involves an observer and
something that is observed. Ferrer’s (2014) interest
in emancipatory philosophy, on the other hand,
appears to have focused his view on the fact that
an ideal objectivity does not actually exist, and
that the fiction of objectivity has been used to
rationalize the discounting of human suffering and
human spirituality, along with the exploitation of
individuals and communities. Likely, both are true:
more data points tend to yield results that are more
generalizable, and the myth of an ideal objectivity—
which has no particular utility in research—has
served to condone dismissals of lived experience
as well as personal and social injustices. The
differences between Friedman and Ferrer seems to
reflect more about how differently their focus rests,
even when using the same term, and less about any
implications for transpersonal research.
While there are no doubt many points of
difference remaining between Ferrer and Friedman,
a careful reading of Friedman’s (e.g., 2013/2015)
affirmation of empiricism and Ferrer’s (2014)
critique of the same suggests that there may also
be more than a few similarities—and that some of
the apparent disagreements, if considered carefully,
may dwindle into insignificance.
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A Way Forward, Perhaps
cientific empiricism, when considered from a
well-tempered perspective that acknowledges
its utility while curbing its hubris, may turn out to
be reasonably consistent with how a participatory
view might hold it—as yet another situated way to
approximate shared reality. Holding empiricism as
a limited but useful tool—and acknowledging it as
the conventional emic perspective of the culture
of science—does not prohibit the use of plural
epistemologies, so that rationality and empirical
evidence become a minimum standard of discourse
rather than a maximum ideal. Philosophy is always
implicit in empirical work, and influential studies
often entail a good amount of intution, imagination,
and creativity in their design. In a participatory
frame, empirical discourse can include all of these
and more—lived experience, hermeneutics, even
metaphysical speculation—so long as these are
critically situated and not advanced as claims that
demand acceptance without support or scrutiny.
These do not seem like onerous requirements in a
scholarly context.
There will still be some in the transpersonal
field who see empirical research as a sort of "gateway
drug" likely to lead down some slippery slope to
rampant intolerance of the very topics that the field
has championed. Yet it may not be the methodology
of empirical science as much as its conceit that has at
times evoked its rejection in transpersonal circles. To
be sure, holistic communities are equally vulnerable to
inflation, on occasion appearing to embrace spiritual
elitism in response to a dismissive scientific culture. A
participatory stance may be of some modest service by
offering opportunity to set aside both species of hubris.
Were the culture of empirical science to be
more informed by the values of tolerance toward
other situated reality frames, tolerance born from a
vision of self-evident human rights, then these twin
children of the Age of Enlightenment might usher in a
science better suited to the study of the whole person
amidst the cultural complexities of the 21st century.
If careful, rigorous empiricism were accompanied
by the cultivation of humility, respect, curiosity,
open-mindedness, and active efforts to “try on”
other assumptions about reality in an appreciative
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spirit, then it might become something akin to a
participatory empiricism—a science that might not
need to marginalize or reject exceptional human
capacities even when these were demonstrated and
documented in controlled conditions.
It is possible that such an empirical science
might come closer to acceptability by both Friedman
and Ferrer—and perhaps to more of the transpersonal
field as well. Transpersonal scholars need not wait
for the mainstream of psychology to transform in
these ways; it is possible for those within the field to
embrace and model a version of science that is both
epistemologically tolerant and empirically sound. With
a little creativity and imagination it may turn out that
we are, after all, the ones we have been waiting for.

its own historical, cultural, and literary context.
Wade's piece acknowledges this, but instead
engages in a cross-cultural survey of the types of
meaning attached to divine emasculation based
on how a variety of myths explicitly describe the
narratives of emasculated gods and how castration
changed their divine powers. Her treatment is in this
way more hermeneutical than historical or literary,
as an inquiry into what these mythic themes might
convey to a modern reader. She concluded that
while "the messages vary, but at their core they are
stories of transformation and liberation" (p. 51).

In This Issue
his issue opens with a new installment to Harry
Hunt's series, Intimations of a Spiritual New
Age, titled, Martin Heidegger's Phenomenology
of Numinous/Being Experience and the "Other
Beginning" of a Futural Planetary Spirituality. This
follows Hunt's 2017 paper on universalized Christian
mysticism in the life and work of Simone Weil, and
his two 2018 papers on Wilhelm Reich's efforts to
develop a bio-energetic spiritual psychology. This
important series considers several formative figures
in the envisioning of a this-worldly mysticism and
futural New Age spirituality between the 1930s and
1950s. Hunt considers Heidegger's later work on
"the cognitive-noetic meaning of numinous-mystical
feeling" (p. 2) as part of his search for Western
spiritual renewal and re-sacralization of nature. Hunt
faces up squarely to Heidegger's earlier embrace of
National Socialism, effectively situating this episode
within the trajectory of his intellectual and personal
development. The result is a nuanced and insightful
treatment of Heidegger's vision that includes his
warning—relevant for a transpersonal psychology—
against excessive subjectivism, psychic adventuring,
and focusing on the exotic and unusual for its own
sake.
Following this is a contribution by Jenny
Wade on The Castrated Gods and their Castration
Cults: Revenge, Punishment, and Spiritual Supremacy. In order to understand a myth properly, each
theme and image deserves to be situated within
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